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Abstract: In a 2012 article on Bultmann and Augustine, R. W. L. Moberly argued that the 
church should be understood as a “plausibility structure” for faith and thus a presupposition for 
the interpretation of Scripture. My response to him in 2014 addressed misinterpretations of 
Bultmann but did not speak to the central issue of the church as a presupposition. The present 
article rectifies this omission by interrogating the meaning of the church in the present discussion 
of “theological interpretation of Scripture” (TIS), which largely views the church as a distinct 
culture. The church-as-culture model bears an important resemblance to the church-as-Volk 
model that was dominant during the period of the church struggle in Germany in the 1930s. 
Bultmann developed his concept of the church as an eschatological community in direct contrast 
to the church-as-Volk idea. If the church is in some sense a presupposition for theological 
interpretation, then we first have to ask what we mean by “church,” and some answers to that 
question may be theologically problematic. 
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Revisiting Bultmann and Augustine 
In a recent exchange, Walter Moberly and I discussed the role of the church in the interpretation 
of Scripture, with particular attention to the legacy of Rudolf Bultmann.1 At the heart of 
                                                
1 See R. W. L. Moberly, “Theological Interpretation, Presuppositions, and the Role of the 
Church: Bultmann and Augustine Revisited,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 6, no. 1 
(2012): 1–22; David W. Congdon, “Kerygma and Community: A Response to R. W. L. 
Moberly’s original thesis was the claim that the sociological entity of the church is a 
presupposition for the interpretation of Scripture. He made this argument—with some assistance 
from Peter Berger and Lesslie Newbigin—in conversation with Augustine’s statement that “I 
would not believe the gospel if the authority of the Catholic Church did not move me.” He 
argued that Bultmann “had little to say theologically about the church” and likely “would not . . . 
have given a positive reading to Augustine’s sentence.”2 Moberly attributed this lack of attention 
to the church to certain cultural and theological factors, some benign3 and others more 
problematic.4 In essence, he argued that Bultmann took the church for granted as part of his 
German Lutheran (i.e., Christendom) context.  
My response to Moberly sought to demonstrate that Bultmann’s treatment of the church 
was not due to some cultural blind spot but was in fact directly connected to his positive 
conception of the kerygma. As a dialectical theologian in the Lutheran tradition, Bultmann 
understands revelation as the word that comes from God to the world. The church comes into 
existence whenever people receive this word and declare it to others. When this occurs, we can 
say that church tradition belongs to the event itself. Crucially, though, Bultmann insists that 
revelation always remains a divine event and does not become a piece of the world. Rather than 
a mark of conformity to his culture, I argued that this very position is what funds Bultmann’s 
critique of the German Christian movement, which he understands precisely as a reduction of 
revelation to the empirical community of Germany (“blood and soil”). 
                                                                                                                                                       
Moberly’s Revisiting of Bultmann,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 8, no. 1 (2014): 1–23; 
R. W. L. Moberly, “Bible and Church, Bultmann and Augustine: A Response to David 
Congdon,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 9, no. 1 (2015): 39–48. 
2 Moberly, “Theological Interpretation,” 21. 
3 For example, “the fact that it is the Bible, more than any other religious text(s), that is of 
supreme existential significance is so much part of the air [Bultmann] breathes that in important 
respects he fails to reflect on it as a presupposition for his biblical exegesis” (ibid., 11). 
4 Two examples will suffice. First, “Bultmann’s inability to have anything other than a likely 
shrug to contribute to discussion of the maturing and deepening of human character and its 
possible significance for biblical interpretation is surely indicative of a real deficiency within his 
preferred categories of understanding” (ibid., 10). Second, “Bultmann’s membership of the 
Confessing Church did not apparently give him any appreciation of ecclesiology as potentially 
generative of a critique of certain common cultural assumptions” (ibid., 21). In my response to 
Moberly, I disputed the latter statement in particular, since it was based on an interpretive error, 
namely, that Bultmann’s discussion of nation in his lectures on theology indicated his agreement 
with the wider German, indeed National Socialist, culture of his day, when it fact it was written 
in 1933 expressly to criticize the German Christians. 
In his reply to me, Moberly correctly points out that my response did not address the 
main thrust of his argument, namely, that the visible, public church is “a plausibility structure for 
Christian believing.”5 He asks (and answers in the negative), “Would Bultmann have agreed with 
Augustine?”6 I agree with Moberly that, in certain key respects, Bultmann and Augustine would 
not have agreed, and I readily admit this was not the question I intended to answer. In that sense 
my response left the second-half of his article largely untouched. My concern was that, in setting 
up Bultmann as a foil for Augustine, Moberly was misrepresenting Bultmann in a way serious 
enough to warrant correction. Giving Bultmann a fair hearing was an end in itself. At the same 
time the missiological and intercultural material toward the end of my response was intended as 
an indirect comment on Moberly’s proposal.7  
The task of this article is to make explicit what was merely implicit in my previous article, 
but to do this requires taking a historical and dogmatic detour through modern ecclesiology. Just 
as Bultmann wrote about the church within a particular theological and political context, so too 
the interest in the church within contemporary “theological interpretation of Scripture” has its 
own context. If we are going to make the church a hermeneutical presupposition, we need to 
investigate what exactly we mean by “church.” In this article I advance the claim that there is a 
correspondence between the concept of the church within theological interpretation of Scripture 
and the concept developed by the German Christians against whom Bultmann was arguing. In 
both cases there is a resistance to the idea of the church as an inherently missionary community 
of crosscultural translation. Bultmann’s eschatological understanding of the church holds fast to 
the New Testament witness to the church’s missionary calling in Christ. 
 
The Church as Culture 
Moberly’s argument that “the life and witness of the Christian churches is in important ways a 
legitimate presupposition . . . for belief in the biblical content” ought to be uncontroversial.8 As 
he explains it, one believes—and one continues to believe—because one has been shaped by a 
                                                
5 Ibid., 18. 
6 Idem, “Bible and Church,” 44. 
7 After summarizing my thoughts on the missiological nature of demythologizing, Moberly 
simply writes: “These are major issues that indeed merit serious discussion” (ibid., 41). Moberly 
does not see this material as relevant to the questions he was trying to ask. I hope to demonstrate 
its relevance in the remainder of this essay. 
8 Ibid., 42. 
particular community of faith. The church in this sense is the context within which one believes 
the message of the gospel. We might call this the principle of contextuality: all biblical 
interpretation presupposes a social or ecclesial context in which the text becomes existentially 
meaningful. At this level there is, in fact, agreement between Augustine and Bultmann, 
something I tried to indicate in my response when I pointed out that, for Bultmann, exegesis 
presupposes “the tradition of the church of the word.” Only insofar as the interpreter stands “in 
the tradition of the word” is she able to interpret the text.9 But Moberly criticizes Bultmann for 
not including the social reality of the church “as a theological presupposition of the kind that 
interpreters . . . bring to bear on their reading of the biblical text.”10 We might call this the 
principle of normativity. The problem is that the first principle does not entail the second. It is 
one thing to say our commitment to these texts presupposes the fact of our social context; it is 
another thing entirely to say this context must play a normative role in the interpretation of these 
texts. To understand why Moberly understands the church as both context and norm, while 
Bultmann does not, we need to interrogate their respective ecclesiologies. 
Moberly’s articles, along with the wider literature on theological interpretation, raise a 
fundamental theological question: What exactly is the church? When we say that the church is a 
presupposition for biblical interpretation, which church do we have in mind: the local 
congregation, the group of people who identify as “Christian” in a national census or Pew 
Research Center survey, a particular confessional community (defined, for example, by the 
Augsburg Confession or the Westminster Confession of Faith), the so-called “Great Tradition” 
defined by the first four (or more?) ecumenical councils, or something else entirely? Asking 
                                                
9 Rudolf Bultmann, “Das Problem einer theologischen Exegese des Neuen Testaments,” in 
Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie, vol. 2: Bultmann, Gogarten, Thurneysen (ed. Jürgen 
Moltmann; Munich: Kaiser, 1963), 66–67. See Congdon, “Kerygma and Community,” 8. 
Moberly does not refer to this passage from my article, but it seems to me that Bultmann here 
grants what Moberly argues for on the basis of Augustine. Moberly claims that “it was 
Bultmann’s membership of the church (in one of its Lutheran forms) that made him privilege the 
NT and bring certain fundamental presuppositions about the intrinsic significance of the Bible to 
his work. The fact that he himself was apparently unable to recognize this or reflect on it is no 
reason why others should do likewise” (Moberly, “Theological Interpretation,” 21). But in fact 
Bultmann did recognize this fact explicitly and highlighted its importance. Whether he should 
have reflected on it as a normative presupposition for interpretation is another question entirely. 
10 Moberly, “Theological Interpretation,” 6. Later he says that the church “is indispensable 
for giving content to and making accessible the enduring and universal significance of the 
biblical witness” (ibid., 20; emphasis added). 
about the definition of the church presupposes a still more fundamental question, namely, what 
constitutes the church’s apostolicity? If the church is the community devoted “to the apostles’ 
teaching and fellowship” (Acts 2:42), what establishes a community as being in continuity with 
the faith of the apostles?11 
By and large it would seem answers to these questions are largely assumed within the 
conversation about theological interpretation of Scripture. To take just one example, the 
inaugural issue of Journal of Theological Interpretation included an article by Richard Hays that 
makes the following claims: 
Theological exegesis is a practice of and for the church. We lavish our attention on the 
biblical texts because these texts have been passed on to us by the church’s tradition as 
the distinctive and irreplaceable testimony to events in which God has acted for our 
salvation. . . . Learning to read the text with eyes of faith is a skill for which we are 
trained by the Christian tradition. Consequently, theological exegesis knows itself to be 
part of an ancient and lively conversation. We can never approach the Bible as though we 
are the first ones to read it—or the first to read it appropriately. We know that we have 
much to learn from the wisdom of the people who have reflected deeply on these texts 
before us. Consequently, theological exegesis will find hermeneutical aid, not hindrance, 
in the church’s doctrinal traditions.12 
Moberly’s original article is effectively an extension of Hays’s claim in the above quote that we 
attend to “the biblical texts because these texts have been passed on to us by the church’s 
tradition.” The church is the presupposition for our reading of these texts as the authoritative 
word of God. From this Hays concludes that “the church’s tradition” should serve as a 
hermeneutical aid. But which church and whose tradition and what kind of aid? 
The phrase “trained by the Christian tradition” is significant. R. R. Reno, in his series 
preface to the Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible, writes: “Do our attention and 
judgment need to be trained, especially as we seek to read Scripture as the living word of 
God? . . . Our vision is darkened and the fetters of worldly habit corrupt our judgment. We need 
                                                
11 For the best exploration of this question, see John Flett, Apostolicity: The Ecumenical 
Question in World Christian Perspective (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2016). 
12 Richard B. Hays, “Reading the Bible with Eyes of Faith: The Practice of Theological 
Exegesis,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 1, no. 1 (2007): 11–12, 14–15. 
training and instruction in order to cleanse our minds.”13 Reno finds the necessary training and 
instruction in “a body of apostolic doctrine sustained by a tradition of teaching in the church.”14 
This body of doctrine—the so-called “rule of faith” (regula fidei)—provides the “clarifying 
principles” and the “schematic drawing” to make sense of the Bible. If we ask where we can find 
this apostolic doctrine, Reno names “the Nicene tradition,” “the Niceno-Constantinopolitan 
Creed,” “ancient baptismal affirmations of faith,” “the Chalcedonian definition,” and “the creeds 
and canons of other church councils.” As if anticipating the objection that many important 
aspects of the tradition are not defined in official creedal documents—and those creedal 
statements are not self-interpreting anyway—Reno goes on to say that the rule of faith is not 
“limited to a specific set of words, sentences, and creeds. It is instead a pervasive habit of 
thought, the animating culture of the church in its intellectual aspect.”15 
The animating culture of the church—we come here to the heart of the matter. 
Theological interpretation of Scripture seems to presuppose not just a generic “church,” but 
rather a very specific account of the church as a distinct culture.16 To call the church a 
“plausibility structure,” as Moberly does, is to identify the church as a culture, since Peter Berger 
uses the term as a synonym for “cultural world.”17 This understanding of the church as its own 
                                                
13 R. R. Reno, “Series Preface,” in Jaroslav Pelikan, Acts (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2005), 13. 
14 Ibid., 12. 
15 Ibid., 14. 
16 I would not claim that theological interpretation of Scripture requires an account of the 
church as culture, since Barth and Bultmann engage in such interpretation without this idea. But 
as theological interpretation is currently practiced within the Anglo-American academy, this 
appears to be the dominant presupposition. There are historical reasons for this rooted in the fact 
that theological interpretation of Scripture arose in the United States out of postliberalism, which 
has as one of its defining characteristics the concept of the church as culture. 
17 Berger writes: “Worlds are socially constructed and socially maintained. Their continuing 
reality . . . depends upon specific social processes, namely those processes that ongoingly 
reconstruct and maintain the particular worlds in question. . . . Thus each world requires a social 
‘base’ for its continuing existence as a world that is real to actual human beings. This ‘base’ may 
be called its plausibility structure.” See Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a 
Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 45. And by “world” 
Berger means a “cultural world” that is “not only collectively produced, but it remains real by 
virtue of collective recognition” (ibid., 10). Berger and Thomas Luckmann write elsewhere: 
“The plausibility structure must become the individual’s world, displacing all other worlds, 
especially the world the individual ‘inhabited’ before his alternation.” See Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 158. Defining the church as a plausibility 
cultural context is one of the underlying assumptions in much of theological interpretation that 
has, for the most part, gone unexamined.18 But this account of the church predetermines the 
limits of faithful biblical interpretation. If the church is already a culture—particularly a culture 
invested with apostolic authority—then the content of the church’s identity is inextricably bound 
up with a particular historical form, and any attempt to translate the church into a new cultural 
context would be unfaithful to its apostolicity. Robert Wilken makes this very claim. “Culture 
lives by language,” he writes, and “if there is a distinctly Christian language, we must be wary of 
translation.” Translation would only be a departure from the distinctive culture of the church. 
The task for the church in the West, therefore, is “to tell itself its own story and to nurture its 
own life, the culture of the city of God, the Christian republic.”19 The task is not to translate but 
to assimilate: “There must be translation into the Lord’s style of language, bringing alien 
language into the orbit of Christian belief and practice and giving it a different meaning.”20 
Robert Jenson even goes so far as to say that the church is not only a culture but should ideally 
develop its own “Christian high culture,” which is simply “that culture intensified.”21 And since 
this culture comprises signs “that are not items of a language”—for example, images, 
processions, ritual practices, architecture, and the like—they are not “disposable by 
translation.”22 Interpretation of the biblical text can thus be an assimilation of other cultures into 
the church’s singular apostolic culture, but it cannot translate the gospel into a plurality of 
                                                                                                                                                       
structure thus entails an antagonistic relationship with other cultural contexts, which is precisely 
the problem with the church-as-culture model. 
18 For a critique of the conception of the church as a culture, see Flett, Apostolicity, 103–37. 
19 Robert L. Wilken, “The Church as Culture,” First Things 142 (2004): 35–36. 
20 Idem, “The Church’s Way of Speaking,” First Things 155 (2005): 30. We can trace this 
idea back to Lindbeck’s well-known definition of postliberal theology as intratextual theology, 
which “redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into 
extrascriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the 
world the text” (George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
Postliberal Age [25th Anniversary ed.; Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009], 
104). 
21 Robert W. Jenson, “Christian Civilization,” in God, Truth, and Witness: Engaging Stanley 
Hauerwas (ed. L. Gregory Jones, Reinhard Hütter, and C. Rosalee Velloso da Silva; Grand 
Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005), 158. Given that Jenson contrasts this “Christian high culture” with 
Africa and Asia, it is clear that he understands this culture to be the culture of “Christian 
Europe.”  
22 Idem, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2: The Works of God (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 60. 
diverse cultural forms, since any act of translation would be to deviate from the faith of the 
apostles. The concrete form of the church-as-culture is therefore both context and norm; the 
practices and traditions of the church are transcultural, universal, and beyond critique. 
This conception of the church-as-culture implicitly underlies Moberly’s objection to 
Bultmann’s observation that the NT texts encounter us as strange and alien. While Moberly 
agrees that the NT originated in an alien culture, he argues that Bultmann’s contention is false  
insofar as one considers the NT documents as coming to us today through a history of 
some 2,000 years of continuous interpretation and use, in which their language, concepts, 
and world picture have been continuously appropriated in the life of the church, in liturgy, 
music, art, architecture, commentary, preaching, and daily living (and have been 
substantially embodied in Western culture as a whole until recent times).23 
In other words, the texts are not culturally alien to us only insofar as the church is our culture. 
Such a claim, of course, presupposes that becoming a Christian means becoming enculturated 
within a particular way of life. The church either displaces or is identical with one’s 
geographical-temporal cultural context. If it displaces that context, then we have a separatist 
conception of the church (e.g., a monastic order); if it is identical with that context, then we have 
some version of Christendom, to which Moberly refers when he speaks of the church being 
“substantially embodied in Western culture.” Whether the church keeps its culture distinct from 
the world or assimilates the world into its culture, either way the relationship between the church 
and its surroundings is an inherently antagonistic one. Other cultural contexts are enemy 
territory; the church can either overcome the enemy or remain set apart from it.24 
There are many reasons to be concerned about this understanding of the church as it 
relates to biblical interpretation. One question has to do with the NT support for the church-as-
culture model.25 While there is clearly a greater concern for the church in the later writings of the 
                                                
23 Moberly, “Theological Interpretation,” 10. 
24 Stephen Pickard warns that “the Church will be sharply distinguished from the world” 
whenever there is a “sacred inflation” of the church due to a “Docetic ecclesiology.” See Stephen 
K. Pickard, Seeking the Church: An Introduction to Ecclesiology (London: SCM Press, 2012), 65. 
25 Ernst Käsemann, for his part, argues that Paul “is not interested in the church per se and as 
a religious group. He is only interested in it in so far as it is . . . the sphere in which and through 
which Christ proves himself Kyrios on earth after his exaltation.” The problem is that “what Paul 
preached in Christological terms has now been turned into the function of ecclesiology,” and we 
start to see this already in Ephesians, where “the function of Christology . . . consists in caring 
NT canon, especially in the pastoral and catholic epistles, is this a normative trajectory that finds 
fulfillment in modern ecumenical efforts, or is this instead a deviation from the kerygmatic norm 
that comes from the church growing more concerned with its own preservation and identity than 
with the coming Lord? Even if one takes the former view, it is not clear that this justifies viewing 
the church as a particular culture. A more compelling reason to be concerned about the current 
discussion of the church has to do with its implications for mission, which is what I gestured 
toward in the conclusion to my response to Moberly.26 Ernst Käsemann points us in the right 
direction when he says, regarding Paul’s concept of the body of Christ, that “the watchword is 
solidarity, not uniformity. Paul finds it important for the church to remain polyform. Only in this 
way can it pervade the world, since the world’s everyday reality is not to be conformistic.”27 
While Käsemann was thinking primarily in terms of individual gifts and callings, the present 
reality of world Christianity forces us to grapple with the church not only as polyform but more 
specifically as polycultural. The cultural multivalence of world Christianity involves a diversity 
of languages, rituals, structures, aesthetic styles, and the like, which are necessarily connected to 
a diversity of theologies and theological presuppositions. Assuming such diversity is both 
legitimate and necessary, it follows that it is necessary to distinguish between the defining 
message of Christianity and the cultural forms in which that message takes contextual shape, and 
this distinction then makes it possible to engage in translation. Rejecting translation, which the 
culture model requires, is effectively to deny the diversity-in-solidarity that Käsemann sees as 
characteristic of the church.28 
                                                                                                                                                       
for the orderly growth of the church.” See Ernst Käsemann, “The Theological Problem Presented 
by the Motif of the Body of Christ,” in Perspectives on Paul (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 102–
21, at 117 and 121. It is telling when Jenson writes that “the church’s cultural identity simply is 
Israel; to see what is our culture as church, we can only read the Old Testament. . . . Even as the 
church’s reading of the Old Testament is always an interpretation by the crucifixion and 
resurrection, it remains the case that to know what is appropriate to her culture she has no place 
else to look.” See Robert W. Jenson, “Election and Culture: From Babylon to Jerusalem,” in 
Public Theology in Cultural Engagement (ed. Stephen R. Holmes; Milton Keynes: Paternoster 
Press, 2008), 59. Jenson assumes the church is a culture and thus the OT provides the necessary 
content. But what if the lack of cultural definition in the NT indicates we ought to think of the 
church in radically different terms? 
26 Congdon, “Kerygma and Community,” 17–23. 
27 Käsemann, “Theological Problem,” 118–19. 
28 For a broader critique of the postliberal account of Christianity as a distinct culture, see 
Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 
We are forced, in other words, to make a decision. Either the church is a single uniform 
apostolic culture—a culture that is itself a contingent product of the church’s history in the 
European West—which means that all other cultures must conform to the dominant church’s 
(doctrinal, liturgical, aesthetic) structure, or the church is a multicultural and polyform 
community whose essence is not defined by a specific doctrinal tradition and structure but by a 
particular divine reality, the transcendence of which places it beyond every worldly entity, 
including the church in all its cultural diversity. We cannot have it both ways. We must either 
recognize that the church-constituting event stands above and beyond all cultural contexts as 
their ground, limit, and norm, or we must conflate this event with a particular culturally 
conditioned tradition, thereby making the church’s relation to other contexts combative in 
principle. If the church’s rule of faith is a culture, then every practice of interpretation and 
communication—whether it is the act of interpreting Scripture or the act of missionary 
proclamation—becomes a colonialist act, since the church would be replicating its culture by 
assimilating a foreign culture into its own. 
 
The Church as Volk 
The postliberal account of the church as an apostolic culture arose in part as a response to the 
Bultmann school. While Bultmann never encountered the postliberal position directly, there are 
points of continuity between the latter and the position that Bultmann actually opposed during 
his life, namely, the conception of the church as a Volk. 
The German word Volk has no direct English equivalent but is usually translated as 
“people” or “nation,” though it carries a specific set of connotations that these other words do not 
accurately convey.29 While the word has roots in the Old High German folc meaning a mass of 
people or body of soldiers, the modern German concept of Volk owes its origins to eighteenth-
century romanticism, especially the writings of Johann Gottfried von Herder, where the concept 
                                                                                                                                                       
93–119. Tanner advocates for a view of Christian identity as a “hybrid formation” that is 
“essentially impure and mixed” (ibid., 114). 
29 The word Volkstum is equally untranslatable and refers to the character and traditions of 
the Volk. It is sometimes translated as “nationality,” “nationhood,” or “national customs.” For the 
sake of clarity I have left both Volk and Volkstum in the German. 
of Volk developed as a romantic alternative to Enlightenment rationalism.30 Whereas 
Enlightenment philosophers conceived of the state as a mechanical political entity “held together 
by brute force,” Herder conceived of Volk and nation as “the natural family, an organism of 
nature.”31 Herder analyzed the natural family in terms of “communities or Völker that preserve 
separate and unique identities. For Herder, the Volk is the most important collectivity, 
determined by climate, education, and relations with neighbors. Each Volk maintains its own 
identity through language, character, and environment.”32 According to Wulf Koepke, “Herder 
sees something like Volk as determined by a common way of thinking, thus by tradition and 
culture, and above all, by language.”33 Volk thus names a specific form of what we might call 
“culture.” 
What makes Volk distinctive in relation to “culture” is that Herder connects this concept 
to a sentimental primitivism: Volk does not refer to just any culture but to a culture untainted by 
civilization. The Volk is “a class apart from philosophers, poets, and orators,” namely, those who 
have been affected by “artificial methods of training and culture.” Volk refers instead to 
“primitive peoples” who are “more nearly the natural man.”34 Like many of the romantics of his 
day, in contrast to the Anglo-American idea of nature as intrinsically violent and savage (e.g., 
Hobbes, Locke, Tennyson), Herder was captivated by the idea of the “noble savage.” For him the 
state of nature was a nearly mystical ideal and norm for human life. Consequently, “the moral 
standards and intellectual equipment found among [primitive peoples] are eulogized and 
idealized whenever these peoples as groups are compared with civilized communities.”35 In sum, 
                                                
30 See Georgiana R. Simpson, “Herder’s Conception of ‘Das Volk’” (PhD diss., University of 
Chicago, 1921), 1; Alexander von Bormann, “Volk als Idee: Zur Semiotisierung des 
Volksbegriffs,” in Volk, Nation, Europa: Zur Romantisierung und Entromantisierung politischer 
Begriffe (ed. Alexander von Bormann; Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998), 35–41. 
31 H. W. Koch, The Hitler Youth: Origins and Development, 1922–1945 (New York: Stein 
and Day, 1975), 5. 
32 Ken Koltun-Fromm, Moses Hess and Modern Jewish Identity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2001), 48. 
33 Wulf Koepke, as quoted in Sonia Sikka, Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: 
Enlightened Relativism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 127. Note the similarity 
between this and Reno’s definition of the church’s culture as a “pervasive habit of thought.” 
34 Simpson, “Herder’s Conception of ‘Das Volk,’” 9–10. 
35 Ibid., 10. 
the German concept of Volk “is specifically romantic, conservative (‘Blut und Boden’) and 
anthropological.”36 
With this constellation of associations in mind, we can see why Friedrich Schleiermacher 
adopted the term Volk into theology to form Volkskirche.37 He introduced the concept of 
Volkskirche (perhaps best conveyed as the “church-of-the-people”) in his 1822–23 lectures on 
Christian Ethics and used it again in his 1830 second edition of The Christian Faith as a contrast 
to the idea of a “national” or “state” church.38 Since the word Volk referred to the common 
masses in distinction from the civilized, ruling elite, the point of using Volkskirche was to 
emphasize that the church concerns the entire people; it is an Enlightenment-romantic version of 
the priesthood of all believers. According to Andreas Leipold, Schleiermacher “employed the 
concept of ‘Volkskirche’ above all as a polemical combat term against an official-consistorial 
church as well as against a royally imposed Union agenda in Prussia.”39 The emphasis on 
Volkskirche was thus initially a way of freeing the church from subordination under the authority 
of the state. Because membership within the Volkskirche is automatic upon birth, everyone is 
included regardless of class or position. The Volkskirche thus differentiates itself from both state 
churches (like the Church of England) and free churches (like the Baptists). One belongs to the 
Volkskirche not because one is a citizen of a modern nation-state or because one has made a 
personal decision, but because one belongs to the “people,” that is, to a particular community of 
nature (“blood and soil”). 
                                                
36 Arthur Mitzman, “Left Populism and Social Romanticism in 19th Century France: The 
Case of Michelet,” in Volk, Nation, Europa: Zur Romantisierung und Entromantisierung 
politischer Begriffe (ed. Alexander von Bormann; Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998), 
160. 
37 For a history of the concept of Volkskirche from 1822 to 1945, see Andreas Leipold, 
Volkskirche: Die Funktionalität einer spezifischen Ekklesiologie in Deutschland nach 1945 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997), 11–51. The rest of his study explores how 
Volkskirche was understood in the years following the war, from Edmund Schlink to Herbert 
Lindner. A major oversight of Leipold’s work is the Aryan paragraph debate of 1933–34, and 
Bultmann does not appear once in the entire work, despite a section devoted to dialectical 
theology and another on the German Christians. 
38 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Der christliche Glaube: Nach den Grundsätzen der 
evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt (1830/31), ed. Rolf Schäfer, 2 vols., 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 2:438 (§151.1). 
39 Leipold, Volkskirche, 13. 
While it was not a necessary development, one can see how the völkisch movement of the 
German Christians arose: once the local German Volk was defined in racial terms, a 
correspondingly racialized Volkskirche was inevitable. The result can be seen plainly in the 
debate over the so-called “Aryan paragraph” in 1933. On September 25 Paul Althaus and Werner 
Elert wrote their “Theological Report” on behalf of the theological faculty at the University of 
Erlangen, in which they separated “Germanness” (Deutschtum) from “Jewishness” (Judentum) 
as representing two different Völker. Consequently, “the German Volk today perceives the Jews 
in its midst increasingly as an alien Volkstum. . . . [The church] knows itself to be called in the 
present situation to a new awareness of its task to be the Volkskirche of the German people.”40 It 
is important to see that Althaus and Elert came to the position they did because of an assumption 
about what the church is. They took it for granted that the church ought to reflect the will of the 
Volk. If the Volk understands itself in racist terms, then the church as Volkskirche should 
represent this racism. The German Christians were well aware that they were not in continuity 
with the apostolic church on this point, which is why they made a distinction between the 
Missionskirche, the missionary church of the NT, and the Volkskirche. And as I pointed out in 
my previous response to Moberly, this is where Bultmann focused his response: unless the 
church remains a missionary church, it is no longer the church of Jesus Christ.41 And to be a 
missionary church entails being an eschatological community whose identity is never directly 
identical with the context or Volk within which it exists at any given time. 
We are now in a position to compare the two previous accounts of the church: the church-
as-culture and the church-as-Volk. These ecclesiologies represent two modern ways of 
negotiating the relationship between normativity (the criterion of what the church ought to be) 
and contextuality (the form given by the church’s location in history). The two models are mirror 
images of each other. The culture approach assimilates the context into the norm, while the Volk 
approach assimilates the norm into the context. The former is constantly trying to make the 
surrounding culture conform to its particular normative ideal. The latter is constantly adapting its 
                                                
40 Paul Althaus and Werner Elert, “Theologisches Gutachten über die Zulassung von 
Christen jüdischer Herkunft zu den Aemtern der deutschen evangelischen Kirche,” TBl 12 
(1933): 321–24, here, p. 323. Emphasis in original. See Heinz Liebing, ed., Die Marburger 
Theologen und der Arierparagraph in der Kirche: Eine Sammlung von Texten aus den Jahren 
1933 und 1934 (Marburg: Elwert, 1977), 22. 
41 See Congdon, “Kerygma and Community,” 15–17. 
norm to fit the surrounding culture. If the culture approach corresponds to traditional orthodoxy, 
then the Volk approach corresponds to modern liberalism, but both represent forms of western 
Christendom inasmuch as they assume the church is a culture. They share a common DNA even 
though they move in opposite directions. We can further subdivide the culture model into two 
versions: the imperialist version makes the surrounding context conform to its own cultural norm, 
while the separatist version maintains an antithetical and exilic posture with respect to its 
surrounding context. Postliberal theologians generally map on to either the imperialist or 
separatist versions of the culture model, with a strong leaning toward separatism.42 
The point I want to make here is that both the culture and Volk approaches preclude a 
mission method that allows for crosscultural translation. The culture model views translation as 
departing from the sacred norm, while the Volk model views translation as departing from the 
local culture (“blood and soil”). Either way norm and culture have been so closely joined in both 
approaches that the church becomes effectively (or at least ideally) monocultural. Cultural 
diversity is a threat to, rather than a consequence of, the norm of the gospel, precisely because 
the gospel is a culture and thus multiple cultures would mean multiple gospels. 
 
The Church as Eschatological Community 
While the church struggle was a catalyst for his reflections on the topic, Bultmann rejects the 
conflation of gospel and culture on biblical and theological grounds. Eschatology is the key to 
his alternative position: Jesus Christ is the eschatological event, the Christ-kerygma is the 
eschatological word of God, and faith is eschatological existence.43 This leads to a corresponding 
concept of the church as eschatological community. The point of his misunderstood notion of 
“deworldlizing” (Entweltlichung) is not to deny that the church takes form within the world as a 
historical entity with doctrines and practices; it is rather to deny that the norm of the church’s 
existence is to be found in these doctrines and practices. Bultmann’s position is that the 
                                                
42 If Stanley Hauerwas epitomizes the separatist model, then John Milbank epitomizes the 
imperialist. Within contemporary American evangelicalism, Russell Moore represents separatism 
while Jerry Falwell represents imperialism. Lindbeck and Jenson are more ambiguous; they have 
moments where they sound like one or the other. But the church-as-culture approach unites all of 
these approaches. None of them makes missionary translation central to the identity of the 
church. In fact, most of them are strongly opposed to the idea. 
43 See Rudolf Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1953), 
§§29, 34, 50, respectively. 
“proclamation of the word” is what “constitutes the church.”44 The church is a creatura verbi, a 
creature of the word, and this word is God’s eschatological address in the kerygma. The kerygma 
proclaims Christ crucified and our crucifixion with Christ through faith (1 Cor 1:23; Gal 2:19); it 
signals God’s judgment and justification of all human cultures and institutions. God is an 
eschatological God who transcends every culture, and God calls into existence a community that 
likewise transcends every culture—and is thereby free for every culture. The church thus 
understands itself “as the eschatological people of God, as the community of saints who are 
called out of the world, who are deworldlized.”45 But this deworldlizing only places the 
community more fully in the world: 
God is deworldlized in that God’s action is understood as eschatological action: God 
withdraws the person from worldly attachments and places him or her directly before 
God’s eyes. The dehistoricizing or deworldlizing of God and human persons alike is 
therefore to be understood dialectically: the God who stands beyond world history 
encounters human persons precisely in their own history, in the everyday, in its gift and 
demand; the dehistoricized . . . person is directed to the concrete encounter with the 
neighbor, in which a person is genuinely historical.46 
Or as Bultmann says in his commentary on the Fourth Gospel, “the community is eschatological 
and deworldlized within the world.”47 Bultmann’s eschatological model of the Christian 
community therefore makes the possibility of crosscultural translation integral to its 
understanding of the church. The eschatological community is permanently open to new cultural 
forms. 
Understanding Bultmann’s eschatological approach to the church should help explain 
why he cannot place the church alongside “family and national community” (Familie und 
Volksgemeinschaft) as part of what Moberly calls “the social nature of knowledge.”48 To do so 
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48 Moberly, “Theological Interpretation,” 21: “When [Bultmann] touches on the social nature 
of knowledge, it is only family and nation, not church, that are mentioned as formative factors.” 
Moberly cites Rudolf Bultmann, What Is Theology? (trans. Roy A. Harrisville; Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1997), 53–54. See the original in idem, Theologische Enzyklopädie (ed. Eberhard 
Jüngel and Klaus W. Müller; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1984), 40. 
would be the ecclesiological equivalent of placing divine action alongside natural forces like 
gravity, reducing Christ to whatever can be historically reconstructed about him, and interpreting 
faith as a merely neuropsychological phenomenon. In each case it would be tantamount to 
denying the thing itself. With respect to the church there is the additional factor of National 
Socialism. Ranging the church alongside family and national community is precisely what the 
German Christians were doing in 1933 when they defined the church as a Volkskirche reflecting 
the Volk (i.e., national community). In the relevant section from Theologische Enzyklopädie 
(What Is Theology?) Bultmann goes on to speak about Volkstum. He has a footnote in which he 
says “Volkstum is a historical entity [geschichtliche Größe].”49 By contrast he elsewhere writes 
that the church is “not a world-historical [weltgeschichtliche] but rather an eschatological entity 
[eschatologische Größe].”50 He is not here denying that the church has a worldly-historical form, 
as if the church only exists invisibly. He is speaking normatively in this passage about what the 
church truly is according to faith. Bultmann separates the church from sociohistorical factors like 
Volkstum not only because Scripture compels him to do so but because this is at the heart of the 
Confessing Church’s struggle against the German Christians.51 
                                                
49 Bultmann, Theologische Enzyklopädie, 40n24. 
50 Idem, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 467. 
51 In my response to Moberly I pointed out that the passage he refers to in What Is Theology? 
was written in 1933 in reaction to the German Christian movement—and thus not in 1926 as 
Moberly implies, which if true would mean Bultmann refers to Volk and Volkstum as part of his 
own project rather than as a response to others. The German publication makes this much clearer 
by putting line breaks between passages written in different years. Moberly does not mention this 
point in his reply to me but simply says that he does not “find this account of [Bultmann’s] 
silence [about the church in this passage of What Is Theology?] to be entirely persuasive” 
(Moberly, “Bible and Church,” 44n11). But this passage must be understood in its historical 
context. I would argue, in fact, that one needs to isolate all the 1933 passages when reading What 
Is Theology? These have to be read as contextual additions to his lectures designed to address 
matters of controversy during the church struggle. Bultmann refers to family and Volk-
community because these are the aspects of culture being promoted by the German Christians. 
The phrase Familie und Volksgemeinschaft was part of the German educational policy in the 
Weimar era. In 1929 the magazine Kindergärten began to call itself the “Journal of 
Socioeducational Tasks in Family and National Community [Familie und Volksgemeinschaft].” 
In 1933, with Hitler’s rise to power, the magazine became the mouthpiece for Nazi propaganda 
about youth education, now calling itself the “Journal for Political-Educational Tasks in Family 
and National Community.” The point is that those hearing Bultmann give this lecture would have 
known he was referring to ideas being promoted by the government at the time.” When reading 
this one therefore has to pay attention to see where he criticizes Nazi ideology. For instance 
Bultmann has a footnote in which he says that “German” can at best be an “index” of what is 
In response to those who want the church to be a cultural factor in the “social nature of 
knowledge,” Bultmann provides a warning: be careful what you wish for. One may not be at risk 
of the nationalism associated with the Volk model, but one could very well open the door to the 
colonialism made possible by the culture model.52 The eschatological model, by contrast, makes 
missionary translation basic to the church by preventing the church from either imposing its 
culture upon others or collapsing its identity into the culture around it. 
 
The Church and Theological Interpretation 
What does this have to do with theological interpretation of Scripture? Simply this: to the extent 
that theological interpretation makes the church a norm of biblical exegesis, it behooves us to ask 
just which church it has in mind. We cannot appeal to “the church’s doctrinal tradition” or the 
“church’s rule of faith” without asking which approach to the church such an appeal presupposes 
and what implications this has for the life and mission of the Christian community. Identifying 
the church as a “plausibility structure,” and thus as a culture, has ethical, political, and 
missiological ramifications that are not necessarily positive or even consistent with the biblical 
witness. Such a notion might address ecumenical aims and the perceived loss of Christian 
influence in the West, but at what cost? 
Bultmann, for his part, affirms the rule of faith insofar as this regula is the kerygma, the 
message handed on by the church that proclaims the proclaimer, Jesus of Nazareth, to be the 
eschatological event. In this limited sense the church is indeed for Bultmann a presupposition for 
faith’s knowledge of God, the world, and oneself. But the church in Bultmann’s eschatological 
approach is not itself the norm; it hands on (i.e., traditions) the norm that is the kerygma alone. 
The kerygma as the word of God remains the word of God and does not become the word of the 
church. The historical form of the church thus participates in the eschatological reality of Christ, 
but Christ does not become historicized as a piece of the world. For this reason, the church in its 
essence is always an eschatological community and is not properly viewed as a sociological 
entity in the world alongside other entities, such as the nation or the family. In the same way that 
                                                                                                                                                       
right but not a “criterion.” There are also, he adds, “deplorable German practices” (Bultmann, 
Theologische Enzyklopädie, 41n26). 
52 My claim is not that those who hold these models are themselves endorsing nationalism or 
colonialism, only that their ecclesiologies offer no protection against these extremes, and in some 
cases they might be advocating for a kind of nationalism or colonialism unwittingly. 
the Christ whom we worship cannot be directly identified with the Jesus accessible to historical 
research, so too the church as the eschatological community of Christ cannot be directly 
identified with the visible, empirical community. Of course, we always encounter the church as 
an empirical, social body, and in this sense the church is indeed a context for theological 
interpretation. But the church, including its doctrines and practices, cannot serve as a norm for 
interpretation in this capacity. The church is only normative in its eschatological identity, as the 
people addressed and called by God in the kerygma that proclaims and enacts God’s saving 
action in Christ. Once we understand this we can see that Bultmann does make the church a 
preunderstanding for interpretation, but he does so precisely by making the kerygma his critical 
norm for understanding the biblical message. 
Theological interpretation that makes the church normative for exegesis ultimately runs 
the risk of presupposing the results of exegesis. This brings us full circle to where Moberly 
began, namely, with Bultmann’s 1957 essay, “Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?” 
Bultmann here argues that exegesis necessarily has presuppositions (Voraussetzungen) but 
should be without prejudices (Vorurteile). According to Moberly’s summary of the first part of 
the essay, “one must not approach a text in such a way that one only hears what one wants to 
hear, and not what the text really says.”53 Bultmann specifically rejects two forms of prejudicial 
exegesis: allegorical interpretation and exegesis “guided by dogmatic prejudices.”54 Moberly 
criticizes Bultmann regarding the opposition to dogma, arguing that Bultmann assumes his own 
dogmatic prejudices in the demythologizing program. In my previous response I explained that 
Bultmann is not opposed to all theological presuppositions but only to those that compete with 
and are allowed to overrule historical research.55 While that remains true this does not explain 
why critical historical inquiry is important. Exegesis for Bultmann is an exercise in the 
interpretation of history, and given that history continually unfolds in new ways it follows that 
“all historical knowledge stands open for discussion.”56 The results of exegesis are always open 
for each person in every generation. The problem with interpretation guided by dogma is that it 
only confirms what the church already teaches. Such exegesis is not genuinely open to a fresh 
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Gesammelte Aufsätze (4 vols.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1933–1965), 3:143. 
55 Congdon, “Kerygma and Community,” 8. 
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hearing of the gospel; it has foreclosed on the possibility of the text bearing witness to God’s 
word anew. Moreover, when such dogma is defined in cultural terms, interpretation ends up 
replicating cultural norms. The result, in missiological terms, is formally identical to a colonial 
mission method in which the spread of Christianity is coterminous with the spread of a specific 
“Christian culture.”57 
The question for theological interpretation of Scripture is whether, in making the church a 
presupposition for exegesis, it allows for free and open interpretive inquiry. If the church simply 
names the context within which one encounters the kerygma, then theological interpretation 
would be materially identical with Bultmann’s program. But if the church instead names the 
cultural norm that determines in advance what counts as a faithful reading of Scripture, then 
those engaged in theological interpretation must ask whether, in seeking to honor the community 
of faith, they have not collapsed revelation into history and thereby unwittingly opened the door 
to ideological distortion. The challenge ahead is to affirm the significance of the church within 
theological interpretation in a way that remains open to the future—and thus open to cultural 
differences and the necessity of crosscultural translation.58 
                                                
57 For a related critique of “ecclesiocentric” versions of theological interpretation of Scripture, 
see Angus Paddison, “Who and What is Theological Interpretation For?” in Conception, 
Reception, and the Spirit: Essays in Honor of Andrew T. Lincoln (ed. J. Gordon McConville and 
Lloyd K. Pietersen; Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015), 210–23. As Paddison correctly points 
out, “notions of the text absorbing the world are bound together with robust notions of the church 
as culture” (ibid., 216). Paddison helpfully differentiates between the agenda of theological 
interpretation of Scripture and the arguments used to advance that agenda. Paddison and I are 
both in agreement with the overall agenda, but we share a concern about the ecclesiocentric and 
theocentric arguments used to support it. 
58 My deep appreciation to Collin Cornell for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
Any errors are my own. 
